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Boolos’s proof of incompleteness is extended straightforwardly to yield simple
“diagonalization–free” proofs of some classical limitative theorems of logic.
In his famous paper announcing the incompleteness theorem, Go¨del remarked that, though his
argument is analogous to the Richard and the Liar paradoxes, “Any epistemological antinomy
could be used for a similar proof of the existence of undecidable propositions.” ([7] Note 14). It
is interesting that, despite the fact that the soundness of arguments like Go¨del’s one built on
self–reference (or diagonalization) was often questioned (of course, from a philosophical not a
mathematical point of view), the first attempt to support Go¨del’s claim and prove the theorem
using another paradox (and hence without recourse to diagonalization) came only recently. In
1989, formalizing the Berry paradox consisting in the fact that the least integer not nameable in
fewer than nineteen syllables has just now been named in eighteen syllables, G.Boolos proved
the semantic version of the incompleteness theorem to the effect that there are arithmetical
sentences that are true but unprovable in Peano arithmetic (see [3]). The proof, as Boolos
notes at the end of his paper, “unlike the usual one, does not involve diagonalization”. Not
much later, in a letter, he adds “What strikes the author as of interest in the proof via Berry’s
paradox is [. . . ] that it provides a different sort of reason for the incompleteness [. . . ] ” (cf. [4]).
Perhaps Boolos’s proof was one of the factors that have inspired a wave of “proving old results
in a new way” (see e.g. [1] and the references given there). Nevertheless, unlike the proof
theoretical methods used in both Go¨del’s original proof and Boolos’s one, most of these new
proofs apply sophisticated model theoretical methods that can hardly be considered “finitistic”.
On the other hand, Boolos’s proof can straightforwardly be extended to yield simple proofs
of some fundamental theorems that are related very closely to the incompleteness theorem
and to each other. The two versions of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem (the semantical
and syntactical one describing respectively the relation between truth and provability and that
of provability and refutability) together with their strengthening (the Go¨del–Rosser theorem),
Church’s theorem on the undecidability of provability, and Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability
of truth, in a sense, constitute a complete circle of mutually related statements answering some
basic questions on provability and truth. The close connection between these fundamental results
is also witnessed by the fact that their standard proofs have essentially the same structure :
they all can be derived from a general formal version of the Liar paradox, that is, they can be
considered as different formal resolutions of this paradox (cf. [11]). Now, as we shall show below,
almost the same can be said if we replace the Liar paradox by Berry’s one. Actually, without
any essential modification, the idea underlying Boolos’s proof of incompleteness can be used to
provide “diagonalization–free” proofs of all the basic limitative theorems mentioned above.
After fixing notation and giving the definition of basic notions, we first mimic Boolos’s proof
in a slightly more detailed form than that in which the original proof was given so that we can
continue the proof in different directions, which is just what we shall do.
Let us first fix any one of the standard first order languages of arithmetic. By a formula
(resp. sentence, term etc.) we mean a formula (resp. sentence, term etc.) of this language.
Theories are arbitrary sets of sentences. Robinson arithmetic (cf. [8] I.1.1) will be denoted by Q.
We shall denote the standard model of Q (as well as its universe) by ω, and say that a sentence
is true (resp. a set is definable, defined etc.) if the sentence considered is true (resp. the set is
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definable, defined etc.) in ω. The variables are v0, v1, . . . , vi, . . . . If it seems necessary to indicate
the difference between the closed terms 0, s0, s s0, . . . and their values in ω (i.e. the natural
numbers 0,1,2, . . . ), we shall denote the terms by the underlined versions of their values, but
as a rule, since there is no danger of confusion, we omit the underlining. Generally, the value
of a closed term in ω will be denoted by the boldface version of the letter denoting the term
concerned. Let us choose one of the standard Go¨del numberings. For any formula µ, pµq will
denote the Go¨del number of µ. “iff” stands for “if and only if”, and we often use the symbol
“ ⊜ ” to stress that the equality concerned is a definition.
We say that a formula is Σ1 if it is of the form (∃vi)µ for some ∆0 (i.e. bounded) formula µ.
Σ1 relations are those definable by a Σ1 formula. A formula is Σ (or a Σ formula) if it is provably
equivalent in Q to some element of the smallest set (i.e. the intersection of all sets) containing
all ∆0 formulas and being closed under conjunction, disjunction, existential quantification, and
bounded universal quantification. Further, a formula is said to be ∆ (or a ∆ formula) if both the
formula itself and its negation are Σ. A Σ (∆) sentence is a Σ (∆) formula that is a sentence.
Clearly, a Σ1 formula is also a Σ formula. A relation is called to be Σ (∆) (or a Σ (∆) relation) if it
is definable by a Σ (∆) formula. It can easily be checked that a relation is Σ iff it is Σ1 (i.e. recur-
sively enumerable), and a relation is ∆ iff it is ∆1 (i.e. recursive), cf. e.g. [12] p. 10. A straightfor-
ward induction on the complexity of formulas analogous to those that can be found in [5] (p. 25)
and [8] (I.1.8) shows that Q is Σ complete, that is, all true Σ sentences are provable in Q.
Definition
(i) For any term or formula e, let us denote by |e| the number of symbols occurring in e (we
shall call this number the length of e), and let f : ω2 −→ ω be a recursive function such that,
for any formula µ and natural number i, f(i, pµq) = p(∀v0)(µ ⇐⇒ v0 = i)q. (Obviously, there
exists such a function.)
(ii) For any theory S, let us denote by PrS the set of Go¨del numbers of sentences provable in S.
(iii) Let T be an arbitrary theory. Let us define the relations Fm ⊆ ω, and Lh, Nm ⊆ ω2 as
follows:
Fm ⊜ {i ∈ ω : i = pµq for some formula µ with at most one free variable v0} ,
Lh ⊜ {(i, j) ∈ ω2 : i = pµq for some formula µ such that |µ| < j} ,
Nm ⊜ {(i, j) ∈ ω2 : j ∈ Fm and f(i, j) ∈ PrT }.
For any formula µ and number i, if (i, pµq) ∈ Nm, that is, if µ = µ(v0) has at most one free
variable v0 and T ⊢ (∀v0)(µ(v0)⇐⇒ v0 = i), then we say that the formula µ names the number i.
(iv) It follows from the definition of Go¨del numbering that the Go¨del numbers of formulas whose
variables are all among the first ones are bounded by a recursive function of their length. More
precisely, in the case of any Go¨del numbering, there is a recursive function g (depending on the
particular Go¨del numbering that has been chosen) such that, for any formula µ and number j,
whenever all the variables of µ are among the first j ones (that is, for j ≥ 1, they are all in the
set {v0, v1, . . . , vj−1}), |µ| < j implies that pµq < g(j).
1 Now, let us choose such a g, and let the
relation B ⊆ ω2 be defined in the following way:
B ⊜ {(i, j) ∈ ω2 : (pµq, j) ∈ Lh and (i, pµq) ∈ Nm for some formula µ such that pµq < g(j)}.
1For example, let us consider the most commonly used Go¨del numbering, which (assuming that the Go¨del
numbers of primitive symbols of the language concerned have already been given) is defined for any sequence of
symbols as follows: p〈s0, s1, . . . , sj〉q = p
ps0q
0 · p
ps1q
1 · · · p
psjq
j , where pi is the ith prime (see e.g. [10] pp.135–6). Apart
from variables, our language has only finitely many primitive symbols, so we can define c to be any number that is
greater than the Go¨del numbers of primitive symbols except variables. Let h(j) ⊜ max {c}∪{pviq : i≤j} for every j.
Then, for any formula µ such that |µ| < j and all the variables of µ are among the first j ones, pµq < p
h(j)·j
j .
Clearly, the function g(j) = p
h(j)·j
j is recursive.
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(v) Obviously, Fm and Lh are ∆1 relations. Let us suppose that PrT is definable. (This
condition is obviously satisfied if, e.g., the set of Go¨del numbers of sentences belonging to T is
itself definable.) Then Nm and B are also definable.
(a) Let ϕ(v0, v1) be a formula (with at most the free variables v0, v1) defining the relation B.
We shall choose ϕ to be Σ1 whenever T is recursively axiomatizable. This is possible since, in
this case, PrT is Σ1, thus both Nm and B are also Σ1. (Recall that the class of recursively
enumerable relations is closed under intersection, existential quantification, and the substitution
of recursive functions, cf. e.g. [12] pp. 27–8).
Note that, if a formula µ has at most one free variable v0 and |µ|<j, then, by renaming the bound
variables of µ, we can obtain a formula µ∗ such that µ∗ has at most one free variable v0, µ and µ
∗
are provably equivalent inQ, |µ∗| = |µ|, and all the variables of µ∗ are among the first j ones, that
is, according to our remarks above, pµ∗q< g(j). In view of this fact, for any number i and closed
term s, ϕ(i, s) is true iff there is a formula µ such that |µ| < s and µ names the number i.
(b) Let ψ(v0, v1) ⊜ ¬ϕ(v0, v1) ∧ (∀v2 < v0)ϕ(v2, v1).
For any number i and closed term s, ψ(i, s) is true iff i is the least natural number that cannot
be named by a formula of length < s. (Clearly, ψ(v0, s) has at most one free variable v0.)
(vi) Let k1 ⊜ |ψ(v0, v1)| and let k2 be any natural number that is greater than the number of
free occurrences of v1 in ψ(v0, v1). Let k ⊜ k1 ·k2, t ⊜ 10 · (k ·k). Then k ≥ k1 > 3, k ≥ k2 ≥ 1.
(vii) If T is a consistent extension of Q, then every formula can name at most one number.
(Indeed, i 6= j implies Q ⊢ i 6= j, cf. [8] I.1.6(3).) Further, clearly, formulas provably equivalent
in T name the same number (if they name a number at all). Finally, up to provable equivalence
in T , there are only finitely many formulas of less than a given length having at most one free
variable v0. (Recall that, apart from variables, our language has only finitely many primitive
symbols and see our remarks in (v) (a).) Consequently, there are only finitely many different
numbers that can be named by formulas of less than a given length. Thus, there is a least
number that cannot be named by a formula of length less than t. Let it be denoted by n.
Theorem
If T is a consistent extension of Q and PrT is definable, then ψ(n, t) is true, but T 6⊢ ψ(n, t).
Proof. By definition, n is the least number that cannot be named by a formula of length < t,
and, again by definition, ψ(n, t) is true just in this case. Consequently,
(1) ψ(n, t) is true.
On the other hand, by the definition of ψ, (1) implies that
(2) ϕ(n, t) is false.
Further, it is easy to see that
(3) if T ⊢ ψ(n, t), then ψ(v0, t) names the number n.
Actually, we have to show that T ⊢ ψ(n, t) implies T ⊢ (∀v0)(ψ(v0, t) ⇐⇒ v0 = n). Clearly,
in one direction, the formal implication is trivial: T ⊢ ψ(n, t) ∧ v0=n =⇒ ψ(v0, t). The other
direction, in turn, follows from the fact that T is an extension of Q since Q ⊢ v0 ≤ i ∨ i ≤ v0
(cf. [8] I.1.6 (5)), which, in turn, implies a weak kind of provable uniqueness of least elements;
more precisely, for any formula µ(v0) and number i,
Q ⊢ ¬µ(i) ∧ (∀v2 < i)µ(v2) =⇒ (∀v0)[¬µ(v0) ∧ (∀v2 < v0)µ(v2) =⇒ v0 = i ].
Now, it follows from k > 3 that 18k < 8k2. Thus the definition of t implies that |ψ(v0, t)| ≤
|ψ(v0, v1)|+k2 |t| = k1+k2(15+k+1+k+1) = k1+k2(17+2k) ≤ k+k(17+2k) = 18k+2k
2 <
10k2 = t. So we have |ψ(v0, t)| < t, which, together with (3), shows that, if T ⊢ ψ(n, t),
then ψ(v0, t) is actually a formula witnessing the truth of ϕ(n, t). But ϕ(n, t) is false by (2).
Consequently, T 6⊢ ψ(n, t).
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Now we can give the semantical incompleteness theorem in the usual formulation. The theory
T is called to be sound if all the sentences belonging to T are true.
Corollary 1 (Semantic version of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem)
Let PrT be definable (in particular, let T be recursively axiomatizable). If T is sound, then T is
incomplete.
Proof. First of all, for any theory S, let us denote by DedS the set of all sentences provable
in S, and let T ′ ⊜ Q∪T . Then obviously, Ded T ′= Ded (Q∪DedT ), that is, PrT ′ = PrQ∪Ded T .
Since Q is finite and PrT is definable by our assumption, the set of Go¨del numbers of the
sentences in Q∪Ded T is again definable, which, in turn, implies the definability of the set
PrQ∪Ded T = PrT ′ . Further, Q is sound by definition, thus T
′ is also sound. Soundness, in
turn, implies consistency. Consequently, T ′ satisfies the conditions of the Theorem. Therefore
T ′ 6⊢ ψ(n, t) and ¬ψ(n, t) is false. Thus, on the one hand, T 6⊢ ψ(n, t) follows from the fact that
T ⊆ T ′, on the other hand, sound theories cannot prove false sentences.
So far we have only reiterated Boolos’s proof with some minor modifications that open up the
possibility to make a few steps farther along the lines set by the original proof, and have formu-
lated its most immediate consequence.2 In order to proceed, let us observe that, though Boolos’s
proof is essentially a formalization of the Berry paradox, it is not the most straightforward one.
As a matter of fact, the theorem that can be considered as the most faithful formal version of
the Berry paradox is Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth. Rephrasing Go¨del’s above
quoted remark, we may conjecture that “The formal version of any epistemological antinomy is
just the statement on the undefinability of truth, and hence could be used for its proof”. The
reason is simple enough. As Tarski puts it in connection with the Liar paradox (cf. [13] p. 76.),
we cannot talk about the truth in the language of arithmetic since otherwise “the antinomy of
the liar could actually be reconstructed in this language”. As a simple corollary of the Theorem
shows, literally the same can be said about the Berry paradox.
Corollary 2 (Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of arithmetical truth)
The set of Go¨del numbers of true sentences is not definable.
Proof. Let Tr be the set of Go¨del numbers of true sentences and let us suppose that Tr is
definable. Choose T in the Theorem to be the set of all true sentences, that is, let
T = {σ : σ is a true sentence}. Then, clearly, T is deductively closed, i.e. the sentences prov-
able in T are all in T . Consequently, PrT = Tr, so that T is consistent and PrT is definable.
Moreover, by definition, T ⊇ Q. So we can apply the Theorem: ψ(n, t) is true but unprovable
in T . But PrT = Tr implies that this is impossible because it means that, for any sentence σ,
σ is true iff σ is provable in T .
2The detailed exposition, however, has its reward. The Theorem is a slightly more general version of the
semantical incompleteness theorem than the usual one. Indeed, it seems that the standard proofs (cf. e.g. [6] p.229
or [2] p.100), being essentially based on the diagonal lemma in one way or other, yield the theorem in such a form
in which the condition of soundness of the theory concerned (which is, of course, a much stronger requirement
than that of its consistency) inevitably appears; see the proof of the abstract version of this theorem in [11]. For
that matter, if we had followed Boolos’s proof word by word, then we could have weakened even the condition
that T is an extension of Q. Actually, in order to define n, it is enough to suppose that the sentences i 6= j, i, j∈ω
are all theorems of T . Then we can proceed as follows. ψ(v0, t) defines n as the least element of a non–empty set
of natural numbers. Since the least element of such a set is unique, the sentence η ⊜ (∀v0)(ψ(v0, t)⇐⇒ v0 = n),
expressing the uniqueness of this element and the fact that this element is just n, is true. On the other hand,
the provability of η in T would entail that ϕ(n, t) is true (recall that |ψ(v0, t)| < t), contradicting the truth of
ψ(n, t). As far as the third condition of the Theorem is concerned, the usual strong assumption of recursive
axiomatizability of T can obviously be weakened to the definability of PrT in the classical proofs as well.
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Kikuchi has modified Boolos’s notion of naming to obtain the syntactic version of the first
incompleteness theorem for suitable extensions of Peano arithmetic and the second incomplete-
ness theorem (see [9]).3 As far as the first incompleteness theorem is concerned, in fact, this
modification is not needed. What is more important, with the help of making some plausible
additional observations, we can derive the syntactic incompleteness theorem from the previous
results for a considerably weaker theory than Peano arithmetic:
Corollary 3 (Syntactic version of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem)
Let T be a recursively axiomatizable extension of Q.
(i) If T is consistent, then T 6⊢ ¬ϕ(n, t).
(ii) If T is ω–consistent, then T 6⊢ ϕ(n, t).
Proof. Since T is recursively axiomatizable, ϕ(v0, v1) is, by definition, a Σ1 formula. Further,
since ω–consistency implies consistency, the conditions of the Theorem hold in both cases.
(i) Since ϕ(v2, t) is Σ , the sentence (∀v2 < n)ϕ(v2, t) is also Σ. Moreover, it is true. (This follows
from the definition of ψ and (1) in the proof of the Theorem.) Therefore, by Σ completeness,
T ⊢ (∀v2 < n)ϕ(v2, t). Hence T ⊢ ¬ϕ(n, t) would imply T ⊢ ψ(n, t), contradicting the Theorem.
Thus T 6⊢ ¬ϕ(n, t). 4
(ii) Suppose that T is ω–consistent. Since ϕ(v0, v1) is now Σ1, there is a ∆0 formula µ(v0, v1, vi)
such that ϕ(v0, v1) = (∃vi)µ(v0, v1, vi). As we have already seen, ϕ(n, t) is false (cf. (2) in the
proof of the Theorem). It follows from this that, for any number j, ¬µ(n, t, j) is a true ∆0
sentence. Using Σ completeness, we have T ⊢ ¬µ(n, t, j) for every j, which, by the definition of
ω–consistency,5 implies that T 6⊢ (∃vi)µ(n, t, vi), i.e. T 6⊢ ϕ(n, t).
One of the standard ways to prove the Go¨del–Rosser theorem is to show that it is a direct
consequence of the Church theorem. We shall also follow this route, that is, using the previous
results, we first show that no consistent extension of Q is decidable :
Corollary 4 (Church’s theorem on the undecidability of arithmetic)
If T is a consistent extension of Q, then T is undecidable.
Proof. Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that PrT is a recursive relation. It follows from this
that Nm is also a recursive one, hence B is again recursive since, on the one hand, Fm and Lh
are recursive, on the other, the class of recursive relations is closed under intersection, bounded
quantification, and the substitution of recursive functions (cf. e.g. [12] pp. 27–8). Consequently,
the formula ϕ defining B can now be chosen to be ∆. Since T is supposed to be a consistent exten-
sion of Q and PrT to be recursive (which, of course, implies the recursive axiomatizability of T ),
we can apply Corollary 3 (i). Consequently, T 6⊢ ¬ϕ(n, t). This, however, leads to a contradiction
since, by (2) in the proof of the Theorem, ¬ϕ(n, t) is true, i.e. it is a true Σ sentence. Its truth,
in turn, by Σ completeness, implies its provability in T , that is, T ⊢ ¬ϕ(n, t).
3There is, however, a minor mistake in his proof of the first incompleteness theorem (see the proof of Theorem
2.2 (ii) in [9]). Indeed (using the notation of [9]), Q(m,ρ) is obviously not Σ1. What is needed, therefore, in
order for that proof given in [9] to go through, is the simple fact (to be shown, needless to say, without using the
soundness of PA) that there is a Σ1 sentence Q
∗(m, ρ) satisfying not only the requirement that Q(m,ρ) implies
Q∗(m,ρ) in PA, but also the additional one that the truth of Q∗(m,ρ) implies the same for Q(m,ρ).
4Note that ¬ϕ(n, t) is yet another sentence that is true but unprovable.
5T is ω–consistent if for any formula η(vi), it follows from T ⊢ (∃vi)η(vi) that T 6⊢ ¬ η(j) for some number j
(cf. e.g. [10] p. 142).
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In the usual way, Church’s Theorem immediately yields
Corollary 5 (Rosser–Go¨del incompleteness theorem)
If T is a consistent and recursively axiomatizable extension of Q, then T is incomplete.
Proof. Let us suppose that, on the contrary, T is complete. Let Snt(v0) and Neg(v0, v1) denote
∆ formulas defining, respectively, the set of Go¨del numbers of sentences and the relation that
holds between the Go¨del number of a sentence and that of its negation. Further, let PrT (v0) a
Σ formula defining the set PrT . Now we set
PrcT (v0) ⊜ ¬ Snt(v0) ∨ (∃v1)(PrT (v1) ∧ Neg(v0, v1)).
Then PrcT (v0) is a Σ formula. On the other hand, it follows from the completeness and con-
sistency of T that PrcT (v0) defines just the complement of PrT . Therefore, both PrT and its
complement are Σ, so that PrT is recursive, contradicting the previous corollary.
The proofs we have given demonstrate that the Boolos–style formalization of Berry’s paradox
is, in fact, a proof schema. Indeed, in order to obtain the proofs of Go¨del’s semantical incom-
pleteness theorem, Tarski’s theorem, Go¨del’s syntactical incompleteness theorem, and Church’s
theorem, we have simply applied the common conceptual framework given implicitly by Boo-
los’s incompleteness proof to four kinds of formal theories of arithmetic, namely, to theories for
which the set PrT is, respectively, definable, the set of (Go¨del numbers of ) all true sentences,
recursively enumerable, and recursive.
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